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Post by mikegarrison on Dec 23, 2019 11:59:35 GMT -5
Well, Congress got their sacrificial goat. Now maybe they feel happy.
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Post by Phaedrus on Dec 23, 2019 13:23:49 GMT -5
Well, Congress got their sacrificial goat. Now maybe they feel happy. Congress or Wall Street?
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Post by mikegarrison on Dec 23, 2019 14:19:22 GMT -5
Well, Congress got their sacrificial goat. Now maybe they feel happy. Congress or Wall Street? I think Congress was more eager to go headhunting, actually. Makes them look like they are on top of things. Keep in mind, I have the same sources on this as anybody else, but I think the final straw was when the FAA chief publicly signaled that he was angry with Muilenburg.
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Post by ironhammer on Dec 23, 2019 20:26:43 GMT -5
Well, Congress got their sacrificial goat. Now maybe they feel happy. And the FAA too. Remember, the FAA was also dragged into the mess because it was seen as too cozy with Boeing and was perceived as merely rubber stamping whatever Boeing did rather than independently verify things. Whether that is a fair or accurate characterization is beside the point now. The fact is, FAA was also in the gutter and they also need their pound of flesh to lessen the heat off of them. This is far from fixing the MAX and Boeing's own management issues of course: www.forbes.com/sites/natebennett/2019/12/23/boeings-board-missed-its-chance/#7a6026a5b7f9
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Post by mikegarrison on Dec 23, 2019 20:36:31 GMT -5
I'll point out that Muilenburg came up through engineering. His new replacement is a finance guy, another one of the many executives who learned their trade under Jack Welch at GE. I guess we'll have to see how that works out. In many ways, I think the outcome here may be the opposite of what Phaedrus has been talking about. Muilenburg ran into problems with the press and Congress in part because he was acting like an engineer. Congress, the press, the business execs, and the crisis management experts all expect a) heads to roll, and b) an immediate apology and acceptance of guilt. Muilenburg was all process and technical solution -- let's find out what happened, let's fix the problem, then let's move on. No heads rolling (at first). No immediate apology before the investigation was complete. Many, many people had no real interest in finding out what happened, especially if it involved pilot error. They were invested in the storyline of "big corporation undercuts safety for profits" and didn't really give a damn about whether that was actually true or not. The story was just too attractive.
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Post by ironhammer on Dec 23, 2019 20:41:22 GMT -5
I'll point out that Muilenburg came up through engineering. His new replacement is a finance guy, another one of the many executives who learned their trade under Jack Welch at GE. I guess we'll have to see how that works out. In many ways, I think the outcome here may be the opposite of what Phaedrus has been talking about. Muilenburg ran into problems with the press and Congress in part because he was acting like an engineer. Congress, the press, the business execs, and the crisis management experts all expect a) heads to roll, and b) an immediate apology and acceptance of guilt. Muilenburg was all process and technical solution -- let's find out what happened, let's fix the problem, then let's move on. No heads rolling (at first). No immediate apology before the investigation was complete. Many, many people had no real interest in finding out what happened, especially if it involved pilot error. They were invested in the storyline of "big corporation undercuts safety for profits" and didn't really give a damn about whether that was actually true or not. The story was just too attractive. Yes, that is a good point. But accountability, whether it's fair or not, is what the corporate world expects, and the finance folks called the shots in the end on this. Fact is, Boeing under Muilenberg was perceived as not handling the MAX crisis well, struggling with communication and being seen, fairly or not, as cold and uncaring. Simply saying the public and Boeing had different expectations and way of doing things is not good enough. And if they need a scapegoat to fall, so be it. Yes, Calhoun is a finance guy, I am not sure how that will work out, the management cultural issues we discussed may still be there after MAX is given the clear to fly again. But right now, with Muilenberg being untenable in his position, who would better replace Muilenberg, that list is short. Calhoun may be a short-term replacement in any case, he will likely be there to see MAX get back in service and he will ride off into retirement. I don't think he is a long-term replacement of Muilenberg.
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Post by Phaedrus on Dec 23, 2019 21:37:57 GMT -5
I'll point out that Muilenburg came up through engineering. His new replacement is a finance guy, another one of the many executives who learned their trade under Jack Welch at GE. I guess we'll have to see how that works out. In many ways, I think the outcome here may be the opposite of what Phaedrus has been talking about. Muilenburg ran into problems with the press and Congress in part because he was acting like an engineer. Congress, the press, the business execs, and the crisis management experts all expect a) heads to roll, and b) an immediate apology and acceptance of guilt. Muilenburg was all process and technical solution -- let's find out what happened, let's fix the problem, then let's move on. No heads rolling (at first). No immediate apology before the investigation was complete. Many, many people had no real interest in finding out what happened, especially if it involved pilot error. They were invested in the storyline of "big corporation undercuts safety for profits" and didn't really give a damn about whether that was actually true or not. The story was just too attractive. Well, accountability, whether it's fair or not, is what the corporate world expects. Fact is, Boeing under Muilenberg was perceived as not handling the MAX crisis well, struggling with communication and being seen, fairly or not, as cold and uncaring. Simply saying the public and Boeing had different expectations and way of doing things is not good enough. And if they need a scapegoat to fall, so be it. Yes, Calhoun is a finance guy, I am not sure how that will work out, the management cultural issues we discussed may still be there after MAX is given the clear to fly again. But right now, with Muilenberg being untenable in his position, who would better replace Muilenberg, that list is short. Calhoun may be a short-term replacement in any case, he will likely be there to see MAX get back in service and he will ride off into retirement. I don't think he is a long-term replacement of Muilenberg. Mike makes a great point though. The solution needs to be technical and you Just got rid of the technical guy. Now you expect a financial guy to shepherd a technical solution through the gauntlet? Chances are very slim , unless he completely gives the technical team carte blanche, which is very unlikely. Finance brings nothing to the table that is useful at this point. Yes, it will be "interesting" but I don't hold out hope. On the other hand Muilenberg came up through the Boeing technology group, not the McDonnell Douglas management %*$# show. How did he let it go this far? Unless he was forced to do things the McDonnell Douglas way.
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Post by ironhammer on Dec 23, 2019 21:43:06 GMT -5
Well, accountability, whether it's fair or not, is what the corporate world expects. Fact is, Boeing under Muilenberg was perceived as not handling the MAX crisis well, struggling with communication and being seen, fairly or not, as cold and uncaring. Simply saying the public and Boeing had different expectations and way of doing things is not good enough. And if they need a scapegoat to fall, so be it. Yes, Calhoun is a finance guy, I am not sure how that will work out, the management cultural issues we discussed may still be there after MAX is given the clear to fly again. But right now, with Muilenberg being untenable in his position, who would better replace Muilenberg, that list is short. Calhoun may be a short-term replacement in any case, he will likely be there to see MAX get back in service and he will ride off into retirement. I don't think he is a long-term replacement of Muilenberg. Mike makes a great point though. The solution needs to be technical and you Judy gout rid of tyger technical guy. Note you expect a financial guy to shepherd a technical solution through the gauntlet? Chances are very slim , unless he complete gives the technical team carte blanche, which is very unlikely. Finance brings nothing to the table that is useful at this point. Yes, it will be "interesting" but I don't hold out hope. Don't feel too bad for Muilenberg though. He is entitled to get up to $39 million in severance pay. So he won't be needing to worrying about money matters for quite a while. On the other hand Muilenberg came up through the Boeing technology group, not the McDonnell Douglas management %*$# show. How did he let it go this far? Unless he was forced to di things the McDonnell Douglas way. I didn't say he made a bad point, I simply state what the coporate world demands, and they prevailed. I don't hold a lot of hope things will drastically change for the better at Boeing either. But it was simply untenable for Muilenberg to retain his CEO position given the circumstances. Calhoun is "shareholder-value-disciple" and was a board member at Boeing for the past 10 years, so his mentality may be part of the problem. Don't feel too bad for Muilenberg though. He is entitled to get up to $39 million in severance pay, so he won't be needing to worry about money matters for quite a while.
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Post by Phaedrus on Dec 23, 2019 22:20:10 GMT -5
Mike makes a great point though. The solution needs to be technical and you Judy gout rid of tyger technical guy. Note you expect a financial guy to shepherd a technical solution through the gauntlet? Chances are very slim , unless he complete gives the technical team carte blanche, which is very unlikely. Finance brings nothing to the table that is useful at this point. Yes, it will be "interesting" but I don't hold out hope. Don't feel too bad for Muilenberg though. He is entitled to get up to $39 million in severance pay. So he won't be needing to worrying about money matters for quite a while. On the other hand Muilenberg came up through the Boeing technology group, not the McDonnell Douglas management %*$# show. How did he let it go this far? Unless he was forced to di things the McDonnell Douglas way. I didn't say he made a bad point, I simply state what the coporate world demands, and they prevailed. I don't hold a lot of hope things will drastically change for the better at Boeing either. But it was simply untenable for Muilenberg to retain his CEO position given the circumstances. Calhoun is "shareholder-value-disciple" and was a board member at Boeing for the past 10 years, so his mentality may be part of the problem. Don't feel too bad for Muilenberg though. He is entitled to get up to $39 million in severance pay, so he won't be needing to worry about money matters for quite a while. I can't speak for Muilenberg but technology guys aren't wired that way. It grinds us that we couldn't solve the problem under our watch.
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Post by dokterrudi on Dec 23, 2019 22:25:13 GMT -5
What a cluster. If they had only designed a new plane. Gotta love shortcuts right? Hopefully if they survive they'll go back to the drawing board literally.
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Post by ironhammer on Dec 23, 2019 22:29:08 GMT -5
I didn't say he made a bad point, I simply state what the coporate world demands, and they prevailed. I don't hold a lot of hope things will drastically change for the better at Boeing either. But it was simply untenable for Muilenberg to retain his CEO position given the circumstances. Calhoun is "shareholder-value-disciple" and was a board member at Boeing for the past 10 years, so his mentality may be part of the problem. Don't feel too bad for Muilenberg though. He is entitled to get up to $39 million in severance pay, so he won't be needing to worry about money matters for quite a while. I can't speak for Muilenberg but technology guys aren't wired that way. It grinds us that we couldn't solve the problem under our watch. I'm glad that is so. Engineers are trained to design things that work and fix problems that crop up. I would be bothered if Muilenberg is not worried that something like this happened and that he was not driven to fix the issue as an engineer by training. I was just saying he didn't need to worry about his retirement savings or getting another job because financially, he is pretty sound.
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Post by ironhammer on Jan 30, 2020 20:58:36 GMT -5
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Post by akbar on Nov 29, 2021 19:58:23 GMT -5
www.npr.org/2021/11/29/1059796996/the-story-of-the-boeing-737-maxGood listen Corporate Greed. Investigative reporter Peter Robison chronicles the tragic story of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in his new book, 'Flying Blind.' He says Boeing failed to warn pilots that new software in the plane could cause its nose to repeatedly pitch down, a malfunction that led to two deadly crashes in the space of five months. Robison says the 737 MAX disaster is at its heart the story of a corporate culture that prized profits and shareholder value over quality and safety — and of federal regulators more committed to serving the airline industry than protecting the public.
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Post by mikegarrison on Nov 29, 2021 20:29:06 GMT -5
I still don't understand how people can possibly still be repeating the idea that the Ethiopian pilots didn't know about MCAS even though their flight happened months after the Lion Air crash. And yet, the story that "the pilots didn't know" is such a seductive story that people believe it even though it is obviously not true.
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Post by Phaedrus on Dec 30, 2021 9:33:22 GMT -5
I'm pretty sure mikegarrison will weigh in on this. Here is the book review of Flying Blind, about Boeing and the 737Max. The Crash of Two Airplanes and the Crisis at Boeing nyti.ms/3xLllD2
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