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Post by ironhammer on Oct 13, 2019 9:04:35 GMT -5
Here's something I want to know. I keep hearing in the news that senior Boeing engineers have been criticizing the company as having lost it's "mojo" ever since it took over McDonnell Douglas. It became too concerned with short term profit, share price and dividend and hence prioritize cost-savings over good engineering. They like to quote former Boeing CEO Jim McNerney's alleged statement ("Every 25 years a big moonshot… then produce a 707 or a 787—that’s the wrong way to pursue this business. The more-for-less world won’t let you pursue moonshots") as evidence that Boeing has abandoned it's appetite to take risk and innovate, creating subpar products like the MAX.
Maybe too simplistic a scenario? Maybe those engineers have an axe to grind? Or is there a grain of truth in these complaints?
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Post by Phaedrus on Oct 13, 2019 16:04:40 GMT -5
Here's something I want to know. I keep hearing in the news that senior Boeing engineers have been criticizing the company as having lost it's "mojo" ever since it took over McDonnell Douglas. It became too concerned with short term profit, share price and dividend and hence prioritize cost-savings over good engineering. They like to quote former Boeing CEO Jim McNerney's alleged statement ("Every 25 years a big moonshot… then produce a 707 or a 787—that’s the wrong way to pursue this business. The more-for-less world won’t let you pursue moonshots") as evidence that Boeing has abandoned it's appetite to take risk and innovate, creating subpar products like the MAX. Maybe too simplistic a scenario? Maybe those engineers have an axe to grind? Or is there a grain of truth in these complaints? I think that these engineers have a valid point AND I think it is simplistic at the same time. In the NYT article I posted, the inadequate training of the pilots in those two crashes play a huge role mainly because the Boeing engineers assumed that the pilots are capable of making what they think is natural and intuitive decisions, like turning the system off if it has been decided that it is malfunctioning, they didn't. BUT at the same time, they knew that the training overseas are very poor, the article cites their experience with the Chinese pilots at one time. The need to develop the 737 Max itself is kind of problematic in my mind since the original version of the plane worked just fine. The question is: is a new plane necessary? Or is it a way to grab more market shares? And where does the decision to base the performance on the previous version and then implement new features which may not make the plane fly in the same way as the previous version come from? I don't know. In my brief sojourn in the airplane world, I have grown very appreciative of the complexity of the entire system and the impossibility of anyone keeping track of all the details pertinent to the safety of the product, it takes a massive effort of seamless communications to make it all happen and if the business side is pushing one way and the technical side is pushing the other way, even slightly, could spell disaster.
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Post by mikegarrison on Oct 13, 2019 20:38:04 GMT -5
The need to develop the 737 Max itself is kind of problematic in my mind since the original version of the plane worked just fine. The question is: is a new plane necessary? Airbus had come out with the A320 NEO, and they were getting ALL the orders. The A320/737 market is intensely competitive. Boeing needed an answer to the NEO, and they needed it quickly. The choice was between an all-new airplane (that would take longer and cost more) or a derived version of the 737. Maybe if the 787 hadn't gone so far over budget and behind schedule the answer would have been different, but squeezing out one more generation from the 737 was the choice that was made by McNerney.
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Post by Phaedrus on Oct 13, 2019 20:57:03 GMT -5
The need to develop the 737 Max itself is kind of problematic in my mind since the original version of the plane worked just fine. The question is: is a new plane necessary? Airbus had come out with the A320 NEO, and they were getting ALL the orders. The A320/737 market is intensely competitive. Boeing needed an answer to the NEO, and they needed it quickly. The choice was between an all-new airplane (that would take longer and cost more) or a derived version of the 737. Maybe if the 787 hadn't gone so far over budget and behind schedule the answer would have been different, but squeezing out one more generation from the 737 was the choice that was made by McNerney. Business gambit that didn't work out.
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Post by ironhammer on Oct 13, 2019 23:04:28 GMT -5
Here's something I want to know. I keep hearing in the news that senior Boeing engineers have been criticizing the company as having lost it's "mojo" ever since it took over McDonnell Douglas. It became too concerned with short term profit, share price and dividend and hence prioritize cost-savings over good engineering. They like to quote former Boeing CEO Jim McNerney's alleged statement ("Every 25 years a big moonshot… then produce a 707 or a 787—that’s the wrong way to pursue this business. The more-for-less world won’t let you pursue moonshots") as evidence that Boeing has abandoned it's appetite to take risk and innovate, creating subpar products like the MAX. Maybe too simplistic a scenario? Maybe those engineers have an axe to grind? Or is there a grain of truth in these complaints? I think that these engineers have a valid point AND I think it is simplistic at the same time. In the NYT article I posted, the inadequate training of the pilots in those two crashes play a huge role mainly because the Boeing engineers assumed that the pilots are capable of making what they think is natural and intuitive decisions, like turning the system off if it has been decided that it is malfunctioning, they didn't. BUT at the same time, they knew that the training overseas are very poor, the article cites their experience with the Chinese pilots at one time. The need to develop the 737 Max itself is kind of problematic in my mind since the original version of the plane worked just fine. The question is: is a new plane necessary? Or is it a way to grab more market shares? And where does the decision to base the performance on the previous version and then implement new features which may not make the plane fly in the same way as the previous version come from? I don't know. In my brief sojourn in the airplane world, I have grown very appreciative of the complexity of the entire system and the impossibility of anyone keeping track of all the details pertinent to the safety of the product, it takes a massive effort of seamless communications to make it all happen and if the business side is pushing one way and the technical side is pushing the other way, even slightly, could spell disaster. Yeah I read that article but I have some reservations about their critique of foreign pilots. Their criticism against Chinese pilots for example might be valid...20 years ago. China have made great strides in safety and pilot standards since then. Simply blaming "inferior" foreign pilots is far from the whole story I think (Not to mentioning quite insulting to foreign pilots to assume their professional standards are all subpar). Bottom line, Boeing dithered for years on whether to build a brand new clean sheet replacement for the 737. Building a clean sheet design was the right way to go, but Boeing just could not make up their minds on it...until the A320NEO forced their hand and so they were essentially pressured into making the MAX instead.
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Post by XAsstCoach on Oct 14, 2019 1:09:32 GMT -5
Just out of curiosity, is there an indicator that the MCAS has deployed? I mean there are a bunch dials, blinking lights and displays that are in front of the pilots and in the moment of panic could easily forget turning off the MCAS as an option.
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Post by mikegarrison on Oct 14, 2019 1:32:58 GMT -5
Just out of curiosity, is there an indicator that the MCAS has deployed? No. At least, there wasn't before. I don't know if there will be in the future. However, when the trim is moving it is obvious. There are two wheels (one on the left and one of the right) that spin when the trim is moving. (These are also the wheels for manually adjusting the trim.) they have a marked line on them so you can see them spinning. They also make a clacking noise when they spin. This video, which was made in 2015, shows a pilot being trained to learn how to deal with a "runaway trim" situation. This is basically what Boeing and the FAA expected the pilots would do if MCAS activated incorrectly. The trim problem happens about 3 minutes into the video.
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Post by Phaedrus on Oct 14, 2019 6:44:44 GMT -5
I think that these engineers have a valid point AND I think it is simplistic at the same time. In the NYT article I posted, the inadequate training of the pilots in those two crashes play a huge role mainly because the Boeing engineers assumed that the pilots are capable of making what they think is natural and intuitive decisions, like turning the system off if it has been decided that it is malfunctioning, they didn't. BUT at the same time, they knew that the training overseas are very poor, the article cites their experience with the Chinese pilots at one time. The need to develop the 737 Max itself is kind of problematic in my mind since the original version of the plane worked just fine. The question is: is a new plane necessary? Or is it a way to grab more market shares? And where does the decision to base the performance on the previous version and then implement new features which may not make the plane fly in the same way as the previous version come from? I don't know. In my brief sojourn in the airplane world, I have grown very appreciative of the complexity of the entire system and the impossibility of anyone keeping track of all the details pertinent to the safety of the product, it takes a massive effort of seamless communications to make it all happen and if the business side is pushing one way and the technical side is pushing the other way, even slightly, could spell disaster. Yeah I read that article but I have some reservations about their critique of foreign pilots. Their criticism against Chinese pilots for example might be valid...20 years ago. China have made great strides in safety and pilot standards since then. Simply blaming "inferior" foreign pilots is far from the whole story I think (Not to mentioning quite insulting to foreign pilots to assume their professional standards are all subpar). Bottom line, Boeing dithered for years on whether to build a brand new clean sheet replacement for the 737. Building a clean sheet design was the right way to go, but Boeing just could not make up their minds on it...until the A320NEO forced their hand and so they were essentially pressured into making the MAX instead. They said that civil aviation has made strides forward in leaps and bound in China, the reason the author pointing out the issue is to point the finger at the civil aviation authority in those countries and the airline owners and governments. If you are going to buy these very expensive and vastly complicated airplanes you need to train your people to do the job correctly. They did not do that for whatever reason, for cost or because they believe in the prevailing MBA mantra that there are no unique skills necessary to do unique jobs, just general ability is fine. This is a case where the skills are cineptual, of understanding how the plane functions is the critical part of their job. Instead, like most people trying to tread water in their jobs try to make the conceptual into the procedural. Back to Boeing, it is an impossibility to design airplanes to cater to the least common denominators of the general population of pilots.
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Post by ironhammer on Oct 14, 2019 7:31:24 GMT -5
Yeah I read that article but I have some reservations about their critique of foreign pilots. Their criticism against Chinese pilots for example might be valid...20 years ago. China have made great strides in safety and pilot standards since then. Simply blaming "inferior" foreign pilots is far from the whole story I think (Not to mentioning quite insulting to foreign pilots to assume their professional standards are all subpar). Bottom line, Boeing dithered for years on whether to build a brand new clean sheet replacement for the 737. Building a clean sheet design was the right way to go, but Boeing just could not make up their minds on it...until the A320NEO forced their hand and so they were essentially pressured into making the MAX instead. They said that civil aviation has made strides forward in leaps and bound in China, the reason the author pointing out the issue is to point the finger at the civil aviation authority in those countries and the airline owners and governments. If you are going to buy these very expensive and vastly complicated airplanes you need to train your people to do the job correctly. They did not do that for whatever reason, for cost or because they believe in the prevailing MBA mantra that there are no unique skills necessary to do unique jobs, just general ability is fine. This is a case where the skills are cineptual, of understanding how the plane functions is the critical part of their job. Instead, like most people trying to tread water in their jobs try to make the conceptual into the procedural. Back to Boeing, it is an impossibility to design airplanes to cater to the least common denominators of the general population of pilots. I don't buy that argument. Maybe in the case of Lion Air, ok, since they aren't known for safety or professional standard of their pilots. But in the case of Ethiopian Airlines, the pilots actually followed procedures and the plane still crashed. So it's not simply a matter of poorly trained foreign pilots.
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Post by XAsstCoach on Oct 14, 2019 8:25:36 GMT -5
Just out of curiosity, is there an indicator that the MCAS has deployed? No. At least, there wasn't before. I don't know if there will be in the future. However, when the trim is moving it is obvious. There are two wheels (one on the left and one of the right) that spin when the trim is moving. (These are also the wheels for manually adjusting the trim.) they have a marked line on them so you can see them spinning. They also make a clacking noise when they spin. This video, which was made in 2015, shows a pilot being trained to learn how to deal with a "runaway trim" situation. This is basically what Boeing and the FAA expected the pilots would do if MCAS activated incorrectly. The trim problem happens about 3 minutes into the video. Ah, ok, it’s right by their hips so no chance they would miss that there is a trim failure.
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Post by mikegarrison on Oct 14, 2019 11:33:31 GMT -5
No. At least, there wasn't before. I don't know if there will be in the future. However, when the trim is moving it is obvious. There are two wheels (one on the left and one of the right) that spin when the trim is moving. (These are also the wheels for manually adjusting the trim.) they have a marked line on them so you can see them spinning. They also make a clacking noise when they spin. This video, which was made in 2015, shows a pilot being trained to learn how to deal with a "runaway trim" situation. This is basically what Boeing and the FAA expected the pilots would do if MCAS activated incorrectly. The trim problem happens about 3 minutes into the video. Ah, ok, it’s right by their hips so no chance they would miss that there is a trim failure. Well .... There shouldn't be. But one of the concerns that comes up in a lot of airplane crashes is that pilots can get overwhelmed with too much information. It can be hard to diagnose what is actually wrong when multiple systems are throwing out warnings all at the same time. The history of aviation is full of crashes that should have been easily avoidable except the pilots got distracted by some warning or problem in the cockpit and directed their attention away from a more critical issue. It's a human factors problem that both airplane designers and pilot trainers have been trying to solve for a long, long time.
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Post by tomclen on Oct 15, 2019 12:09:01 GMT -5
Remotely related: We recently took a direct flight from Everett (north of Seattle, new to commercial flights) to Denver on an Embraer jet (Brazilian company now involved in a joint venture with Boeing).
It's a smaller jet, about 75 passengers, 2 seats on each side of the aisle. But it was the quietest and most comfortable flight I've taken in ages. There was plenty of leg room. Not sure why they haven't figure out how to cram more seats into these things and make them absolutely miserable as well.
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Post by Phaedrus on Oct 15, 2019 13:40:16 GMT -5
Remotely related: We recently took a direct flight from Everett (north of Seattle, new to commercial flights) to Denver on an Embraer jet (Brazilian company now involved in a joint venture with Boeing). It's a smaller jet, about 75 passengers, 2 seats on each side of the aisle. But it was the quietest and most comfortable flight I've taken in ages. There was plenty of leg room. Not sure why they haven't figure out how to cram more seats into these things and make them absolutely miserable as well. Interesting, I don't know if I'd flown in a new Embraer, I remember a time when I would try to find out what kind of commuter planes my flights were on and I would complain bitterly if it was an Embraer. They were horrid planes at one point, maybe 20 years ago.
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Post by ironhammer on Oct 21, 2019 1:40:21 GMT -5
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Post by tomclen on Oct 21, 2019 8:26:31 GMT -5
In some ways Boeing didn't buy McDonnell Douglas. Oh sure, Boeing money, 13-billion of it, went to the pockets of top MCD shareholders and managers. But after the 'merger' it was the MCD top brass who took over the top executive offices and began running Boeing.
The days of extensive research, training, development and planning were mostly replaced with a laser focus on profits.
The days of Boeing engineers working their way up the ranks to run the entire company are long gone.
Not to suggest that MCD brass don't care about safety. They do of course, because, after all, a deadly accident can be a bump-in-the-profit road.
This is not a business model exclusive to McDonnell Douglas or even to the airline industry.
It is an epidemic in the business world. R&D, safety, pensions, profit-sharing, unions, and so many other one time American benchmarks of business have been replaced by a focus on lavish profits.
There's a reason why you don't have room for your knees on a flight and you can't really recline your seat: top brass need to make MORE, MORE, MORE.
There was a story last week, I don't know if it's true, you know, fake news and all....but the story pointed out that Jeff Bezos could give $250,000 to every Amazon worker and he'd still be a billionaire.
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