Post by Deleted on Jul 31, 2004 17:52:08 GMT -5
Excerpts from a Newsweek article (by Fareed Zakaria) about the 9/11 Report.
...The conclusion takes on the central organizing idea of the post 9/11 strategy--that
we are at war--and is deeply skeptical of it. The report notes that the use of the
metaphor of a war accurately describes the effort to kill terrorists in the field, as in Afghanistan. ...
But the report points out that after Afghanistan, the scope for military action is quite
limited. "Long-term success," it concludes, "demands the use of all elements of national power:
diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and
homeland defense." Even when it speaks of preventive action it suggests "a preventive strategy
that is as much, or more, political as it is military."
...It is increasingly clear that the conflict in Afghanistan falsely fed the idea that the war against
terrorism was a real war. In fact, Afghanistan was an exception. The reality of this threat, the very reason
it is so difficult to tackle, is precisely that it cannot be addressed by conventional military means. Yet
the prism of war has distorted the vision of important segments of Washington, especially within the
Bush administration. This has produced bad strategy. The Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis has written on the Bush
administration's strategy and describes its three pillars as hegemony, preemption and unilateralism. All three
appraches seem justifiable if you believe we are in a war that can be won militarily. All are counterproductive
in a struggle that seeks to modernize alien societies, win over Muslim moderates and sustain cooperation on
intelligence and law enforcement across the world.
The issue of Iraq highlighted these choices. If you believed that this was truly a war, all that mattered was
defeating the enemy. If you believed that a broader political struggle was key, then creating a new and modern
Iraq was in many ways more important than defeating Saddam Hussein. The administration showed its colors
with a brilliant war plan and no postwar planning.
...before and after 9/11 the civilian leadership of the Pentagon--Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas
Feith--was utterly obsessed with Iraq. They dismissed the need for a response to the attack on the USS Cole, which Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz claimed as now "stale." (In fact, it had taken place four months earlier.)
...The bulk of the... recommendations are for a broad political and economic strategy toward the Muslim and
Arab world. The report argues that the United States should "offer an example of moral leadership in the
world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our
neighbors." It recommends substantial resources being devoted to scholarship, exchange and library programs in
the Muslim world, and has a specific, excellent recommendation to fund public education in these countries.
...The report's conclusion repeatedly stresses multilateralism and recognizes that the civilized world will
need a common and coordinated approach to fighting this long struggle.
...Our period of mobilization is now over. Some of what has happened in the heat of these past years was
necessary, some grossly overdone. What is important now is to step back, reflect, reason and construct a longer-term,
sustainable strategy. It is a pivotal moment for whoever occupies the White House in the next four years. He has
the opportunity to act not as a crisis manager but as a strategist, shaping American policy not for the next few
years but for the next few decades. And if he does it right, it could even mean success.
+++
Now, I ( (R)uffda!) ask you: does anyone REALLY think George W. Bush is up to this task?
...The conclusion takes on the central organizing idea of the post 9/11 strategy--that
we are at war--and is deeply skeptical of it. The report notes that the use of the
metaphor of a war accurately describes the effort to kill terrorists in the field, as in Afghanistan. ...
But the report points out that after Afghanistan, the scope for military action is quite
limited. "Long-term success," it concludes, "demands the use of all elements of national power:
diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and
homeland defense." Even when it speaks of preventive action it suggests "a preventive strategy
that is as much, or more, political as it is military."
...It is increasingly clear that the conflict in Afghanistan falsely fed the idea that the war against
terrorism was a real war. In fact, Afghanistan was an exception. The reality of this threat, the very reason
it is so difficult to tackle, is precisely that it cannot be addressed by conventional military means. Yet
the prism of war has distorted the vision of important segments of Washington, especially within the
Bush administration. This has produced bad strategy. The Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis has written on the Bush
administration's strategy and describes its three pillars as hegemony, preemption and unilateralism. All three
appraches seem justifiable if you believe we are in a war that can be won militarily. All are counterproductive
in a struggle that seeks to modernize alien societies, win over Muslim moderates and sustain cooperation on
intelligence and law enforcement across the world.
The issue of Iraq highlighted these choices. If you believed that this was truly a war, all that mattered was
defeating the enemy. If you believed that a broader political struggle was key, then creating a new and modern
Iraq was in many ways more important than defeating Saddam Hussein. The administration showed its colors
with a brilliant war plan and no postwar planning.
...before and after 9/11 the civilian leadership of the Pentagon--Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas
Feith--was utterly obsessed with Iraq. They dismissed the need for a response to the attack on the USS Cole, which Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz claimed as now "stale." (In fact, it had taken place four months earlier.)
...The bulk of the... recommendations are for a broad political and economic strategy toward the Muslim and
Arab world. The report argues that the United States should "offer an example of moral leadership in the
world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our
neighbors." It recommends substantial resources being devoted to scholarship, exchange and library programs in
the Muslim world, and has a specific, excellent recommendation to fund public education in these countries.
...The report's conclusion repeatedly stresses multilateralism and recognizes that the civilized world will
need a common and coordinated approach to fighting this long struggle.
...Our period of mobilization is now over. Some of what has happened in the heat of these past years was
necessary, some grossly overdone. What is important now is to step back, reflect, reason and construct a longer-term,
sustainable strategy. It is a pivotal moment for whoever occupies the White House in the next four years. He has
the opportunity to act not as a crisis manager but as a strategist, shaping American policy not for the next few
years but for the next few decades. And if he does it right, it could even mean success.
+++
Now, I ( (R)uffda!) ask you: does anyone REALLY think George W. Bush is up to this task?
